



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### The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

24 July 1985 DDW-124

## WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS--24 July 1985

#### CIPC Organizational Activities

25X1

25X1

- The DDCI approved the Follow-up CBW Report for distribution, however, he deleted the last sentence in the "Preface" that made reference to the CIPC maintaining an interest in the manner in which the Community reports to the CBW intelligence challenge.
  - In approving the report, the DDCI noted that the sentence was not necessary, and we could reconvene in a year or so. He further noted that he and the DCI did not want the CIPC to have a standing subcommittee on the subject.
  - We are in the process of preparing the report--excluding the sentence mentioned above--for hard copy production and dissemination (see attachment).
- With the exception of the NRO, the NFIC has approved the Terrorism Study. The comments received to date have been suggested minor changes; nothing substantive, and we understand that the NRO's comments fall in the same category.

We are nearing completion of the Narcotics Follow-up report, it should be

ready for your review by Friday, and subsequent distribution to the CIPC members on Monday/Tuesday preparatory for the 5 August CIPC meeting.

detail to the NIC Staff was effected on 22 July 1985.

25X1

On 18 July, Ray talked to our new secretary, in Pittsburgh. She was very pleasant, articulate and anxious to report for work. She is scheduled to EOD CIA on 5 August and the CIPC on 21 August.

25X1 & You will receive it on Lhurdy, 24 July

TOP SECRET

# WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS-24 July 1985

25 <b>X</b> 1	NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE:
25X1 25X1	• George and Paul attended the monthly NIO Warning meeting on Narcotics.  The focus of the meeting was the increasing importance
25 <b>X</b> 1	In addition, the NIO confided that he would be using the CIPC Narcotics Follow-up Report as a basis for testimony before the SSCI hearing on 24 July at which General Williams, DIA, and John Lawn, Administrator, DEA, will also attend.
25 <b>X</b> 1	SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE STUDY:
25 <b>X</b> 1	Rich has drafted the follow-up BMD report and distributed copies to the working group members in preparation for their meeting on 23 July. Thus far, reaction from the members has been good and we are on schedule for meeting the August publication date and a September CIPC meeting on this subject. Rich has also made arrangements to obtain the final version of the Perry Panel Report as soon as signs the transmittal letter.
25 <b>X</b> 1	MOBILE MISSILE STUDY:
	The panel is continuing its work in support of the Defense Science Board.
25X1 25X1	• The CIA reservation about the Mobile Missile Study has been received, however, it was not signed by Bob Gates but by Director, OSWR, and was addressed to not the CIPC Chairman. This was
25 <b>X</b> 1	surprising as we were led to believe this would be a CIA objection. Since C/ACIS, had not yet submitted his input, we called him on Friday to ascertain the status of his input. Doug stated that he did not have time to write one and he would stand behind the OSWR input. He stated the OSWR input was the official CIA response. Doug also wanted to know when he would be invited to the next panel meeting (he has had a long-standing invitation from Ed) and was immediately invited to the
25X1	25 July meeting. He said he would send from his staff.
25 <b>X</b> 1	- Ed will be talking to this week, however, it is noteworthy that most of the issues raised in the OSWR memorandum were identified by the CIPC and will be incorporated into the Mobile Missile Study. Although OSWR wants a footnote to the study, there will be very
25 <b>X</b> 1	little, if anything, to footnote. In any event we will be resolving this issue during the week (attachment, memo).
25 <b>X</b> 1	

## WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS--24 July 1985

• On 22 July CIPC Staffers and Mobile Missile Panel members attended a full day of briefings and demonstrations at the Rome Air Development Center (RADC) at Griffiss Air Force Base, NY. The day was devoted to the various RADC programs relating to the relocatable target problem. It was an interesting and informative set of presentations and well worth the trip. The topics presented were:

Advanced Sensor Exploitation
Cartographic Application to Tactical & Strategic Systems
Precise Target Geopositioning
Advanced Imagery Exploitation
AI applied to I&W
Mass Storage and Retrieval
Knowledge Engineering for Mobile Targets
Experiment in Locating Mobile Command Posts (agenda attached).

• RADC is also sponsoring a seminar on Artificial Intelligence next month. The seminar will be a review of the current AI technology and will be attended by all elements of the Intelligence Community, members of academia, and many of the contractors working in this field.

25 <b>X</b> 1	MI SCELLANEOUS:
25X1	<ul> <li>On 16 and 17 July Paul and attended a Joint Symposium on Theater Force Mix Assessment sponsored by 12 DoD components (including Defense Nuclear Agency, several Deputy Under Secretaries of Defense, and elements of the Army and Air Force) held at the Naval Surface Weapons Center at White Oak Maryland. The purpose of the two day</li> </ul>
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	Attachments: As stated
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SUBJECT: Weekly Activities and Status Report for the DD/ICS--(24 July 1985)

Distribution:

1 - DD/ICS

1 - VC/CIPC

1 - ES/CIPC

1 - CIPC/Subject


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SUBJECT: Joint Symposium on Theater Force Mix Assessments
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3. Missing in much of the discussion were the issues of escalation and
the Soviet view on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Even though the aim of the symposium was to examine force mixes and not grand strategies, force
mives sarve more than the immediate commander and have a large deterrence or
political role as well. Essential to deter is an understanding of those you wish to deter. Thus, some discussion of Soviet capabilities and views would
have placed the force mix question in better perspective.
4. It may well have been that the working assumption going into the
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SUBJECT		Reservation	ns to CIPC So	viet Mobile		
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